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Dr. Fried has contributed to the work a name-index and a subject-index, which seem reasonably adequate. His English proof-reading has made at least one curious blunder (II. 431), where "the pulsied month of war" remotely suggests a "palsied mouth".

CHARLES H. LEVERMORE.

Das Völkerringen 1914/15. Von F. M. KIRCHEISEN. Mit Aktenstücken. Erster (Text-)Band. (Aarau: H. R. Sauerländer. 1915. Pp. xx, 567. 8 marks.)

THIS volume is part of a pretentious history of the war, on the large scale of those of Allen and Simonds now being published. The author, who is a native of Saxony, has long resided in Geneva, which may account for some of his views, and even for the clear and simple prose which he writes. He makes books easily and quickly, but I judge also without much research, with little insight, and no depth of thought. While these pages contain much of interest to him who would read the details, they present few important additions to our knowledge of the subject, little to explain what is not evident already, few generalizations, or summaries, or wise remarks. The plan stated is to make use of official or semi-official documents and the best information obtainable from trustworthy sources among all the belligerent peoples. Actually the work consists in large part of lengthy extracts from newspapers, German and Swiss. True, a *Documentenhalbband* was issued along with this volume, but it is not to be obtained here yet. From what is before me I should conjecture that in it the author uses his texts with such acumen and fairness as intelligent German propagandists have displayed in this country.

The writing is not by one blinded with feeling of superiority or lust for power, but from a kindly gentleman who seems to desire to be fair. In his judgment France is "das aufgeklärteste und demokratischste Land Europas". But even from such a one we find no admission that in any way was Germany to blame for the war, or that any of her deeds have been more than little transgressions justified by evil conditions. In mild simplicity he follows zu Reventlow's school: since the fall of Napoleon England has woven a net about the world so that all men must labor for her and all the world's riches be hers; when Germany resisted, England grew hostile; Edward VII., envious of his nephew, made the Entente Cordiale, rendering France subservient, and then drew along Russia; thus was Germany encircled. He thinks that the measures of Austria-Hungary against Servia were just; the direct cause of the war was the declaration of July 24 that in a conflict between Austria and Servia, Russia could not be indifferent; the Russian ruling classes needed a successful war to regain their vanished prestige; the Allies prepared to attack, Russia really making the first declaration of war; envy of German greatness was one of the major causes.

Most of this is contained in the brief introduction. The bulk of the volume consists of detailed narration, long extracts from journals, and proclamations reprinted. There are the eighteen declarations of war and explanatory documents accompanying. There is a long chapter on the mobilization, which gives little about questions of priority or order, but a great deal of interesting information, largely from newspapers, on the movement of troops and experiences of people. There is a short, worthless account of the military resources and strength of the warring powers. There are finally three chapters on the course of the war itself: the most detailed story which I have seen of the fighting between Austria and Serbia and Montenegro; an excellent and interesting account of the invasion of Belgium; and a minute relation of the battles between Frenchmen and Germans in Alsace-Lorraine. All this is evidently not by a military writer. There are few generalizations of value, and the treatment, entirely narrative, is such that the difficult questions are not even brought to attention. After perusal we are as much in the dark as ever why the French made their offensive into the Reichsland, and why they failed; only incidentally do we notice how much Austria's advantage against her small Slavic enemies was owing to superior artillery.

Some things almost make one doubt the good faith of the author, but I am convinced that they result from honest incapacity, and, probably, too great haste. For us this book possesses greater interest and importance than it would otherwise have, because it is one of the very few books on the war by a German which has come to this country.

EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER.

The Marne Campaign. By Major F. E. WHITTON. [Campaigns and their Lessons, edited by Maj.-Gen. C. E. Callwell, C.B.] (London: Constable; Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1917. Pp. xv, 311. \$4.00.)

MAJOR WHITTON'S careful and highly intelligent study of the Marne campaign of 1914 frankly admits that many matters relating to it remain obscure. A half-century after the American Civil War, for all the wealth of evidence in the shape of orders, despatches, reports, and explanatory comment, some of our war myths are still in the process of being cleared away. The battle of the Marne gave rise to a persistent myth, widely circulated in American newspapers on January 9, 1918, in the announcement of the death of General Grossetti, commander of the 42d Division of the Ninth French Army. Major Whitton punctures this particular myth by showing that the Ninth French Army drove no wedge into the Teutonic centre, that there was no movement resembling such a thrust made by the Ninth Army, that this army had been roughly handled and forced back on September 9, that the widely vaunted movement of the 42d Division made slight progress, and that the Germans